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ABSTRACT 
LINKING HEURISTIC-SYSTEMATIC PROCESSING TO  
ADOPTION OF BEHAVIOR 
Shiyu Yang 
Marquette University, 2017 
This study sets out to draw connections among key components within three 
conceptual models: the Risk Information Seeking and Processing model, the Heuristic-
Systematic Model, and the Theory of Planned Behavior. Specifically, it proposes and 
tests the theoretical linkages among heuristic and systematic information processing, 
depth of processing, attitude stability, and behavioral intention. Archival data drawn from 
a panel survey that concerns health risks from drinking municipal tap water are used for 
theory testing. Findings reveal that systematic processing is positively related to number 
of strongly held behavioral beliefs, strength of belief outcome evaluations, and strength 
of cognitive structure—all indicated depth of processing, and that heuristic processing is 
negatively related to all three measures. Cognitive structure and attitude toward the 
behavior appear to be consistent in direction and strength. Attitude toward the behavior, 
subjective norms, and alternative behavior are positively related to behavioral intention. 
An anticipated positive relationship between perceived behavioral control and behavioral 
intention was not found. Finally, theoretical and practical implications of the findings are 
discussed.  
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Ⅰ. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Water quality issues have long been a subject that can command national 
spotlight. The recent incident of the Flint water crisis in Michigan that has been ongoing 
since 2014 has attracted extensive media attention and provoked heightened societal 
concerns regarding latent risks from municipal drinking water that could pose serious 
harms to human health. Historically, the United States suffered increased outbreaks of 
various waterborne illnesses in the 1990s that have raised public salience of water quality 
issues. Contamination of municipal tap water can result from a variety of sources such as 
toxins, chemicals, and organisms that occasionally slip past the public water treatment 
systems. Lead in service lines, especially those older, corroded pipes that run from the 
water mains to the house and that are in homes is a major concern to many 
municipalities. Although the levels of contaminants in drinking water are regulated and 
constantly monitored, accidents can happen. In their wake, people may be well motivated 
to resort to preventive actions, and one primary remedy is to drink bottled water instead 
of tap water (Anadu & Harding, 2000; Doria, 2006).  
Under such conditions, it is relevant for risk communication research to examine 
the factors that lead to individuals performing a particular risk-reducing behavior, in this 
case, drinking bottled water instead of tap water. The present study investigates this issue 
by studying people’s responses to potential hazards from waterborne parasites lurking in 
municipal tap water drawn from the Great Lakes—the largest group of fresh water bodies 
in the world, in the wake of a large waterborne disease outbreak in Milwaukee, 
Wisconsin, in the 1990s. Despite its age, the dataset allows for a close examination of the 
mechanisms underlying individuals’ communication behaviors and risk-related decision-
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making as well as for theory testing. Moreover, the current relevance of tap water risks 
adds to the value of digging into the dataset to the task of understanding how people 
come to drink bottled water instead of tap water in cope with the risks.  
Relying on Griffin, Dunwoody, and Neuwirth’s (1999) model of Risk Information 
Seeking and Processing (RISP) as the major theoretical framework, this study attempts to 
draw and test linkages among the key constructs within three conceptual models: the 
RISP model, Eagly and Chaiken’s (1993) Heuristic-Systematic Model (HSM), and 
Ajzen’s (1988) Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB), specifically the relationship of risk 
information processing to risk-related attitudes and behaviors. Griffin and his colleagues 
(Griffin, Neuwirth, Giese, & Dunwoody, 2002) presented a study that, for the first time in 
a field setting, linked heuristic and systematic processing to measures of depth of 
processing proposed in the TPB (i.e., number of salient beliefs, evaluation strength, 
cognitive structure strength). However, the researchers did not go beyond the initial 
elements within the TPB. This analysis adds to the current literature on relationships 
among the cognitions of risk information processing, depth of processing, attitude 
stability, and behavioral intention, as it expands the scope of theory testing to the rest of 
the TPB variables as well as an additional variable (i.e., attitude toward alternative 
behaviors).  
Mainly drawn from the HSM and the TPB, as well as from risk perception and 
communication research, the RISP model was devised to illuminate how people seek and 
process information about risks, and how these activities shape attitude formation and 
behavior adoption. Of special interest to this study is the role of styles of risk information 
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processing in the development of preventive behavior. To begin with, relevant aspects of 
the RISP model are discussed as follows.   
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Ⅱ. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
RISP Model and Heuristic and Systematic Processing 
 
 
To form evaluative judgments and develop attitudes, people may exert varying 
levels of cognitive effort as they process judgment-relevant information. The RISP model 
accounts for these variations by incorporating mechanisms found in the Heuristic-
Systematic Model (HSM; Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). As one of the family of dual-process 
theories, the HSM stipulates two basic modalities of information processing—heuristic 
processing and systematic processing. Heuristic modes of processing are less effortful 
and more limited as perceivers mobilize less cognitive resources and formulate 
information-relevant judgments based on simple decision rules, or heuristics, without 
fully absorbing “the semantic content of persuasive argumentation” (Eagly & Chaiken, 
1993, p. 327). Essentially, heuristics are already-existing knowledge schemata stored in 
human memory that are later activated for judgment-relevant use in the presence of 
heuristic cues. Heuristic cue refers to “any variable whose judgmental impact is 
hypothesized to be mediated by a simple decision rule” (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993, p. 327). 
In other words, heuristic cues are any stimuli that activate existing heuristics and 
thereafter catalyze heuristic processing. For example, when risk information that contains 
the heuristic cue of expert opinion (e.g., experts recommending exercise as a strategy to 
cope with the risk of obesity) is presented, the existing heuristic that experts’ statements 
can be trusted may be activated from the memory, and perceivers can form a favorable 
judgment about exercise based on this judgmental rule. Contrary to heuristic processing, 
systematic forms of processing involve more analytic, comprehensive treatment of 
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information (Chen & Chaiken, 1999), and dictate greater cognitive effort, as perceivers 
focus on the actual content of the information.  
According to the HSM, how people process information is constrained by various 
situational, cognitive, and motivational factors. Situational constraints such as time 
pressure may restrict individuals to heuristic processing. Likewise, individuals who are 
lacking in cognitive capacity and resources (e.g., individuals who possess less knowledge 
in the judgment-relevant domain) are less likely to perform systematic processing. The 
HSM assumes that perceivers’ information processing is guided by two principles: the 
economy principle of least effort and the sufficiency principle. Specifically, it is assumed 
that people are limited in cognitive resources and are generally prone to exerting as little 
cognitive effort as possible when they process information. As a result, less effortful 
heuristic modes of processing usually predominate the cognitive process of judgment 
formulation (Chen & Chaiken, 1999). However, when heuristic processing fails to deliver 
results of desired judgmental confidence, or when heuristic processing cannot take place 
(e.g., due to the absence of heuristic cues in the message), perceivers will be motivated to 
engage in more systematic forms of processing and exert whatever cognitive effort that is 
necessary and possible until they think that they have reached “a sufficient degree of 
confidence that their judgments will satisfy their accuracy goals” (Chen & Chaiken, 
1999, p. 74). That is to say, people usually have to strike at a balance between the 
economy principle of mobilizing the least cognitive resources and their motivation to 
acquire sufficient relevant information to formulate an informed judgment. As Eagly and 
Chaiken (1993) point out, sufficiency threshold, or the gap between the level of desired 
judgmental confidence and the level of actual judgmental confidence, is “the fundamental 
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motivator of processing effort” (p. 344), or systematic processing. To note, the distinction 
between heuristic and systematic processing is relative and is not a strict dichotomy. 
Since judgmental confidence is a continuum anchored by actual judgmental confidence 
and desired judgmental confidence, the width of the confidence gap varies continuously 
along the scale, which instigates varying degrees of heuristic and systematic processing. 
In addition, heuristic and systematic modes of processing can co-occur as well as occur 
alone (Chen & Chaiken, 1999).  
The RISP model applies dual processing to contexts where information about 
various risks is concerned. According to the RISP model, the continuum of information 
(in)sufficiency is anchored by two ends—perceivers’ current knowledge and information 
sufficiency threshold. When a perceiver’s information sufficiency threshold, or amount of 
knowledge that s/he thinks s/he should know about a risk, is located at a higher point of 
the information continuum than his or her perceived current knowledge, s/he will be 
motivated to seek risk information more actively and process such information more 
systematically, in order to close the information insufficiency gap and be confident 
enough in the accuracy and validity of his/her judgments about the risk. As the 
information insufficiency gap widens, the likelihood that perceivers will continue to 
engage in more systematic forms of processing increases (Kahlor, Dunwoody, Griffin, 
Neuwirth, & Giese, 2003). The information insufficiency gap can widen due to an 
elevated information sufficiency threshold (i.e., a heightened level of desired knowledge), 
and/or a decreased level of current knowledge. Nevertheless, the information 
insufficiency gap can motivate systematic processing only (a) when perceivers have the 
cognitive capacity to exercise systematic processing (Chen & Chaiken, 1999), (b) when 
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perceivers have the self-efficacy that they are able to gather and comprehend relevant 
information (Dunwoody & Griffin, 2015; Eagly & Chaiken, 1993), and (c) when 
perceivers believe that such information is useful and credible (Dunwoody & Griffin, 
2014; Griffin et al., 2002; Griffin, Powell, Dunwoody, Neuwirth, Clark, & Novotny, 
2004).  
Because systematic processing entails fully absorbing the substance of the 
persuasive message whereas heuristic processing is focused only on a subset of the 
information that allows for the application of simple judgmental rules in formulating 
decisions, heuristic processing tends to yield judgments and attitudes that are “less stable, 
less resistant to counterpropaganda, and less predictive of subsequent behavior than those 
formed or changed on the basis of systematic processing” (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993, p. 
327). Depth of information processing plays an important role in the development of 
preventive behaviors as beliefs are formed or altered in part from processing information 
from some sources such as mass media (Griffin et al., 1999). As Lutz (1977) suggests, 
communication processes can alter the structure of beliefs by creating a new salient 
belief, by altering the strength or salience of a belief, or by modifying its evaluation. 
Attitudes “develop in the course of acquiring information about the attitude object, and 
they keep evolving as existing beliefs change and new beliefs are formed” (Ajzen & 
Sexton, 1999, p. 119). The RISP model proposes that more active seeking and especially 
more intense processing of information about a risk-related behavior lead to (a) 
perceivers possessing a greater number of strongly held behavioral beliefs, and (b) more 
stable cognitive structures about the behavior. Both outcomes should produce more stable 
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appraisal of, or attitude toward the behavior (Griffin et al., 1999). To provide more 
background, we now look at the Theory of Planned Behavior in more detail.  
 
Theory of Planned Behavior: The Role of Beliefs in Predicting Attitude and 
Behavior 
 
 
In extending the implications of risk information seeking and processing to the 
realms of behavior, the RISP model incorporates concepts and measures of Ajzen’s 
(1988) Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB). In brief, the TPB stipulates that attitude 
toward the behavior, subjective norms, and perceived behavioral control are three major 
variables that predict to intention to perform a behavior, and that behavioral intention and 
perceived behavioral control further predict to the actual performance of the behavior. 
Attitude toward the act (AAct) is defined as the extent to which a person has a favorable 
or unfavorable appraisal of a behavior. Subjective norms (SN) refer to the social 
pressures a person feels that s/he should or should not perform a behavior. Perceived 
behavioral control (PBC) indicates the perceived ease or difficulty of performing a given 
behavior (Ajzen, 1991). Adding the PBC variable to the Theory of Reasoned Action 
(Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980; Fishbein & Azjen, 1975), an earlier version of the TPB, 
improves the theory as it overcomes the original model’s limitations in predicting 
behaviors over which people have incomplete volitional control. As individuals’ 
volitional control over performing a behavior decreases, the predictive value of the PBC 
variable increases (Ajzen, 1991). PBC, along with behavioral intention (BI), can be a 
useful predictor of actual behavior to the extent that a person’s perception of the ease or 
difficulty of performing a behavior realistically and accurately reflects actual behavioral 
control (Ajzen, 1991). Altogether, AAct, SN, and PBC predict to an individual’s 
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intention to perform a given behavior (BI). It is assumed that the more favorable the 
AAct and the greater the SN that one should perform a behavior, as well as the higher the 
PBC, the stronger should be the BI (i.e., the more willingly a person will be to perform 
the behavior). A stronger BI and PBC also predict to a greater likelihood that the person 
will actually perform the behavior (B). It should be noted, nevertheless, that BI only finds 
its expression in behaviors that are under volitional control; if the person cannot decide at 
will whether or not to perform the behavior, then BI is out of the question (Ajzen, 1991).  
Beyond predicting human behavior, the TPB sets out to explain it, by employing a 
belief-based approach to measuring antecedents to attitude, subjective norms, and 
perceived behavioral control. A belief about an object is defined as “the subjective 
probability that the object has a certain attribute” (Ajzen & Sexton, 1999, p. 118). In 
Fishbein’s theory (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975), evaluation of, or attitude toward, an object is 
determined by a set of salient beliefs about the object (Ajzen & Sexton, 1999). In the 
TPB, behavior is a function of a person’s salient beliefs relevant to the behavior (Ajzen, 
1991). People weigh each relevant belief amidst a number of other beliefs that they also 
hold about a behavior to form the basis of attitude toward performing the behavior. While 
a person may hold many beliefs about a given behavior, he or she can only attend to a 
relatively limited few of them at any given moment (Ajzen, 1991). It is these more 
readily accessible, or salient, beliefs that determine an individual’s intentions and actions 
(Ajzen, 1991).  
The TPB distinguishes three types of salient beliefs that influence a person’s 
behavior development: behavioral beliefs, normative beliefs, and control beliefs. These 
three types of beliefs serve as antecedents to AAct, SN, and PBC, respectively. 
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Behavioral belief refers to the belief that performing a given behavior will bring about 
certain outcomes or is associated with certain attributes such as the cost incurred. In other 
words, a behavioral belief links a behavior to a certain outcome or attribute (e.g., drinking 
bottled water instead of Great Lakes tap water will help protect a person from being 
harmed by waterborne risks). Because the outcomes and attributes that come to be linked 
to a given behavior of interest are already valued positively or negatively, people 
automatically acquire an attitude (i.e., favorable or unfavorable appraisal) toward the 
behavior as they consider the various salient behavioral beliefs (Ajzen, 1991). The 
strength of a behavioral belief refers to the subjective probability that the behavior will 
produce a certain outcome or is associated with a certain attribute. The more a person 
believes that performing a behavior will bring about a certain outcome, the greater the 
subjective probability, and the greater the belief strength. Using the expectancy-value 
model, the strength of each salient behavioral belief is combined with the subjective 
evaluation of each belief’s outcome (e.g., the goodness or badness) in a multiplicative 
manner, and the resulting products are summed across all salient behavioral beliefs, 
constituting what is termed the “belief-based measure of attitude”, or the cognitive 
structure of attitude, which is hypothesized to be in direct proportion to the standard 
measure of attitude (AAct) toward the same behavior (Ajzen, 1988, 1991).  
Normative belief refers to the belief that a person’s important referent individuals 
or groups will approve or disapprove of performing a target behavior. That is, a 
normative belief links a behavior to the perceiver’s expectation of an important referent’s 
attitude toward the behavior. The strength of a normative belief refers to the subjective 
probability that an important referent will approve or disapprove of performance of the 
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target behavior. The more a person is convinced that an important referent will 
approve/disapprove of it, the greater the subjective probability, and the greater the belief 
strength. A belief-based measure of subjective norms (SN) can be obtained by summing 
across all salient normative beliefs the products of the strength of each normative belief 
multiplied by the person’s motivation to comply with the referent in question (Ajzen, 
1991). Consequently, the belief-based measure of SN should be in direct proportion to 
the global measure of SN.  
Control beliefs speak to the “presence or absence of factors that facilitate or 
impede performance of the behavior” (Ajzen, 1988, p. 125). In other words, a control 
belief links the target behavior to a requisite resource or opportunity (or lack thereof). 
Each accessible control belief that a control factor will be present is multiplied by the 
perceived power of that control factor to facilitate or impede performance of the 
behavior, and the resulting products are summed across all accessible control beliefs to 
create a belief-based measure of perceived behavioral control (PBC), which should be in 
direct proportion to the global measure of PBC (Ajzen, 1991; Ajzen & Driver, 1991).  
 
Linking Information Processing to Attitude and Behavior 
 
 
The depth of information processing has implications for attitude formation and 
behavior adoption and maintenance. Petty and Krosnick (1995) defined attitude strength 
as the power to endure change and the power to have impact on people’s lives. As is 
suggested by the heuristic-systematic model, attitudes formed through more intense 
systematic modes of processing tend to be more stable and resistant to change, whereas 
attitudes developed through heuristic forms of processing tend to be more volatile and 
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less firmly held (Griffin et al., 2002). Explicating their Elaboration Likelihood Model 
(ELM), Petty and Cacioppo posited that central route processing (an equivalent of 
systematic processing in HSM) leads to attitude changes that “will show greater temporal 
persistence, greater prediction of behavior, and greater resistance to counterpersuasion 
than attitude changes that result mostly from peripheral cues”, or heuristic processing 
(1986, p. 175). Furthermore, the researchers reasoned:  
Thus, attitude changes induced via the central route involve considerably more 
cognitive work than attitude changes induced under the peripheral route…. Under 
the central route, then, the issue-relevant attitude schema may be accessed, 
rehearsed, and manipulated more times strengthening the interconnections among 
the components and rendering the schema more internally consistent, accessible, 
enduring, and resistant than under the peripheral route. (pp. 175-176) 
 
This proposition regarding levels of processing and attitude stability has received 
indirect empirical support. Pierro, Mannetti, Kruglanski, Klein, and Orehek (2012) 
conducted a three-phase longitudinal study in which the researchers manipulated a) the 
presence of heuristic cue in the stimulus information, b) the length of the stimulus 
information, and c) message recipients’ involvement in the issue at hand. Particularly, the 
researchers found that among individuals who had high (versus low) involvement in the 
issue, those who read the lengthy (versus brief) information acquired attitudes that were 
more persistent and were linked more strongly to actual behavior. Although the extent of 
information processing was not directly measured, the researchers reasoned that high 
issue involvement and lengthy judgment-relevant information disposed the perceivers to 
more extensive and systematic processing, which resulted in more stable attitude changes 
and higher attitude-behavior correspondence.  
Perhaps a more detailed account of the psychological mechanism of the influence 
of levels of processing on attitude strength is provided by the TPB. According to the 
13 
 
TPB, the different modalities of processing can impact the number of strongly held 
behavioral beliefs and the strength of evaluation of the outcomes of these salient 
behavioral beliefs. As Ajzen and Sexton (1999) pointed out:  
The depth-of-processing dimension is of importance for our purposes because it 
speaks to the domain of beliefs that become accessible in a given context. Clearly, 
the number of accessible beliefs is likely to increase with processing depth, and 
the strength and evaluative implications of accessible beliefs may also change as a 
result of continued deliberation. (pp. 122-123) 
 
The RISP model applies these constructs to risk-related contexts. Particularly, it is 
expected that the style of risk information processing (i.e., systematic and heuristic 
processing) and/or seeking (i.e., non-routine and routine seeking) affects behavioral 
beliefs, belief outcome evaluations, and consequently the cognitive structure of attitude 
toward the behavior (i.e., belief strength × outcome evaluation). More systematic 
processing of risk information is expected to lead to more stable cognitive structure as 
well as attitude toward the behavior. In addition, perceived hazard characteristics (PHC) 
including risk judgment, perceived salience of risk, self-efficacy, and institutional trust 
are also expected to affect people’ behavioral beliefs and cognitive structure of attitude. 
The RISP model also proposes PHC variables as precursors to perceived behavioral 
control, and individual characteristics (especially demographic and sociocultural 
variables) as antecedents to normative belief structure (Griffin et al., 1999).  
Prior risk communication research has examined some of the proposed 
antecedents to risk-related attitudes and behaviors. Griffin and his colleagues (Griffin, 
Neuwirth, Giese, & Dunwoody, 1999) found that greater use of systematic processing of 
risk information from the media and other sources is positively related to the number of 
behavioral beliefs that individuals consider to be important to their risk-coping decisions, 
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and that this positive relationship is further augmented among those with higher levels of 
educational achievement, a measure representing processing capacity. Yang and her 
colleagues (Yang et al., 2010a, 2010b) used the case of clinical trial enrollment as the 
study context wherein the researchers found that, among both cancer patients and healthy 
adults, systematic processing is positively related to favorable belief-based attitude (i.e., 
cognitive structure) toward clinical trial enrollment and, through the mediation of 
cognitive structure, individuals’ behavioral intention to participate in clinical trials. In 
addition, the researchers found that trust in doctors is positively related to favorable 
belief-based attitude toward clinical trial participation and willingness to enroll in future 
trials, and that risk judgment is negatively related to favorable attitude and behavioral 
intention (Yang et al., 2010a). Other studies have also reported a positive relationship of 
systematic processing to risk-related attitude change (Munoz, Chebat, & Suissa, 2010), 
behavioral intentions (Munoz et al., 2010; Wei, Zhao, Wang, Cheng, & Zhao, 2016), 
health-protective action (Hovick, Freimuth, Johnson-Turbes, & Chervin, 2011), and 
policy support (Yang, Rickard, Harrison, & Seo, 2014). Nonetheless, previous studies 
have only examined the relationships that risk information processing has with a few of 
the TPB variables, and research that expands the scope of theory testing to the broader 
RISP processes is needed.  
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Ⅲ. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
 
 
The research questions and hypotheses raised in this study represent the 
relationships among the major components within the Risk Information Seeking and 
Processing model, the Heuristic-Systematic Model, and the Theory of Planned Behavior, 
emphasizing the role of systematic and heuristic processing in shaping attitude strength 
and subsequent behavioral intention. To start with, cognitive processes of attitude 
formation that are more immediately associated with information processing are 
examined. Based on Ajzen’s research (Ajzen, 1991; Ajzen & Sexton, 1999), three 
measures of depth of processing (i.e., number of strongly held behavioral beliefs, strength 
of outcome evaluations, strength of cognitive structure) antecedent to attitude strength are 
examined in relation to information processing. Specifically, the following research 
question is posed:  
 
RQ1: What are the relationships between individuals’ processing of risk information and 
the precursors of the strength of attitude toward the behavior?  
 
Prior research has suggested that as information processing goes more in-depth, 
attitudes formed through it tend to be stronger and more intensely held than those 
developed on the basis of more superficial (i.e., heuristic) forms of processing (Eagly & 
Chaiken, 1993; Griffin et al., 2002). Therefore, six directional hypotheses regarding RQ1 
are generated. Systematic processing is expected to be positively related to the:  
 
H1a: number of strongly held behavioral beliefs associated with the performance 
of a behavior;  
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H1b: strength of outcome evaluation associated with behavioral beliefs;  
H1c: strength of cognitive structure (indirect attitude) toward the behavior.  
 
In the meanwhile, heuristic processing will be negatively related to the:  
 
H1d: number of strongly held behavioral beliefs associated with the performance 
of a behavior;  
H1e: strength of outcome evaluation associated with behavioral beliefs;  
H1f: strength of cognitive structure (indirect attitude) toward the behavior.  
 
The TPB sets out to explain human behaviors by adopting a belief-based approach 
to measuring antecedent to attitudes. Cognitive structure is the indirect (i.e., belief-based) 
measure of attitude toward the behavior. As a surrogate for attitude in the TPB, cognitive 
structure is expected to be consistent with attitude both in terms of strength and direction. 
Therefore:  
 
RQ2: What is the relationship of cognitive structure with attitude toward the behavior? 
Specifically:  
H2a: Strength of cognitive structure will be positively related to strength of 
attitude toward the behavior.  
H2b: Cognitive structure will be positively related to attitude toward the behavior.  
 
The TPB proposes three major predictors to behaviors, namely a person’s attitude 
toward the behavior, subjective norms, and perceived behavioral control. From a 
dispositional perspective, individuals’ attitude toward a behavior should to some extent 
be consistent with their intention to perform the behavior and their subsequent action. 
17 
 
The perception that one’s important others approve of or perform a behavior also 
motivates individuals to perform the behavior. Finally, increases in perceived ease of 
performing a behavior may also boost a person’s behavioral intention and motivates 
action. Therefore, the following research questions and hypotheses are posited:  
 
RQ3: What is the relationship of attitude toward the behavior with behavioral intention? 
Specifically:  
H3: Attitude toward the behavior will be positively related to behavioral intention.  
 
RQ4: What is the relationship of subjective norms with behavioral intention? 
Specifically:  
H4: Subjective norms will be positively related to behavioral intention.  
 
RQ5: What is the relationship of perceived behavioral control with behavioral intention? 
Specifically:  
H5: Perceived behavioral control should be positively related to behavioral 
intention.  
 
In addition to the TPB predictors, the present study investigates how attitude 
toward alternative behaviors may potentially influence the intention to perform a given 
risk-reducing behavior. Because this investigation is exploratory, the relationship will be 
examined via the following research question without directional hypothesis:  
 
RQ6: What relationship does attitude toward alternative behaviors have with behavioral 
intention?  
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Ⅳ. METHOD 
 
 
Study Context 
 
 
The analysis of the present study is based on archival data drawn from the second 
wave of a three-wave panel design study conducted in two medium-sized metropolitan 
areas on the shores of the Great Lakes: Milwaukee, WI, on Lake Michigan, and 
Cleveland, OH, on Lake Erie, in the late 1990s. The survey was funded by a federal grant 
from the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry. In 1993, a tiny parasite 
called cryptosporidium entered the municipal drinking water system of Milwaukee from 
Lake Michigan, and produced the largest waterborne disease outbreak that has been ever 
documented in the history of the United States. Cryptosporidium can cause diarrhea and 
other illnesses in humans (Blair, 1995; Eisenberg, Lei, Hubbard, Brookhart, & Colford, 
Jr., 2005) and is hard to detect and remove from municipal tap water systems. Both 
Milwaukee and Cleveland draw their drinking water from the Great Lakes, and questions 
examining people’s responses to potential hazards from waterborne parasites were 
included in the survey.  
Besides the municipal tap water risk, the panel survey also examined people’s 
responses to two other risks: one is a health risk that concerns the potential hazards from 
consuming Great Lakes fish that may contain polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) and 
other dangerous chemicals, and the second risk is an environmental risk that concerns 
threats posed to the health of the Great Lakes ecosystem by the cumulative effects of 
pollutants from industry, cities, and farms as concentrations of toxins such as dioxin, 
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lead, mercury, mirex, and toxaphene increased. To the purpose of the present study, data 
collected on people’s responses to the municipal tap water risk were utilized.  
 
Survey 
 
 
The data in this study are drawn from the second wave of a panel design study 
conducted in Milwaukee, WI, and Cleveland, OH in the late 1990s. From October 1996 
to March 1997, the Wisconsin Survey Research Laboratory (WSRL), a professional 
research organization associated with the University of Wisconsin-Extension, conducted 
telephone interviews with a random sample of 1,123 adult residents from the two cities 
(579 in Milwaukee and 544 in Cleveland), using random digit dialing. Respondents from 
contacted residences were chosen randomly within the households. The combined 
response rate was 55.2% (61.3% in Milwaukee and 50% in Cleveland) for the first wave 
of the study. From October 1997 through March 1998, the WSRL conducted the second 
wave of the study and successfully reinterviewed 716 (63.8%) of the respondents from 
the first wave (376 in Milwaukee and 340 in Cleveland). In order to control for 
sensitization in the panel, 171 new respondents were interviewed for the second wave, 
using the same procedures as were used for recruiting survey respondents in the first 
wave. The resulting sample size is a total N of 887 (441 in Milwaukee and 446 in 
Cleveland) in the second wave. Because of cost constraints, TPB variables were not 
included in the survey questionnaire until the second wave, and the third wave had to 
concentrate on PCBs in the fish. Therefore, only the second wave data are used in this 
analysis.  
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At the beginning of the telephone interview in the first wave, respondents were 
asked if they had consumed fish caught from the Great Lakes that year, or if they had 
intentionally avoided eating Great Lakes fish due to health concerns, in order to net those 
for whom eating Great Lakes fish is a relevant personal matter. Respondents who had 
eaten or refrained from eating Great Lakes fish were interviewed with questions covering 
fish consumption risks. Respondents to whom eating Great Lakes fish is not a relevant 
personal matter were randomly assigned to one of the other two hazard topics: tap water 
risks and risks to the Great Lakes ecosystem. New respondents in the second wave were 
similarly questioned at the beginning of the interview and assigned to one of the three 
hazard topics. Most questions covering the three hazard topics were constructed in an 
identical manner so that meta-testing of the RISP model across risks would be possible. 
During the interview process, items within a battery of questions (e.g., 5-point, Likert-
type, agreement scale) were presented to respondents starting at a random point in the set, 
so as to minimize potential order effects. Each interview took about 27 minutes. 
Altogether, in the second wave, a total of 528 respondents provided their views about fish 
consumption risks (260 in Milwaukee and 268 in Cleveland), 204 were asked about tap 
water risks (111 in Milwaukee and 93 in Cleveland), and 155 were questioned about risks 
to the Great Lakes ecosystem (70 in Milwaukee and 85 in Cleveland). All required IRB 
and informed consent practices were followed throughout the study.  
 
Measurement 
 
 
Systematic Information Processing 
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Integrating major constructs from the HSM, the RISP model identifies systematic 
and heuristic processing as two basic modes of risk information processing. Systematic 
processing of risk information were measured with five items: “After I encounter 
information about this topic, I am likely to stop and think about it;” “If I need to act on 
this matter, the more viewpoints I get the better;” “After thinking about this topic, I have 
a broader understanding;” “It is important for me to interpret information about this topic 
in a way that applies directly to my life;” and “When I encounter information about this 
topic, I read or listen to most of it, even though I may not agree with its perspective.” 
Respondents indicated their agreement or disagreement with the statements on 5-point, 
Likert-type scales. Factor analysis of the five systematic processing variables and the four 
heuristic processing variables (see below) produced two distinct factors (see Appendix 
A). Systematic processing index was constructed using the weighted factor score (five 
items, omega = .69).  
Heuristic Information Processing 
Heuristic processing of risk information was measured similarly as respondents 
were asked to indicate on 5-point Likert-type scales their agreement or disagreement with 
four statements about how people personally deal with information about the given risk: 
“When I see or hear information about this topic, I rarely spend much time thinking about 
it;” “When I encounter information about this topic, I focus on only a few key points;” “If 
I need to act on this matter, the advice of one expert is enough for me;” and “There is far 
more information on this topic than I personally need.” Heuristic processing index was 
constructed using the weighted factor score (four items, omega = .68).  
Strongly Held Behavioral Beliefs 
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The survey questionnaire in the second wave included items measuring TPB 
variables. Depending on the assigned hazard topic, respondents were asked to assess 
various aspects related to one of three target behaviors: avoiding eating fish from the 
local Great Lake (Lake Michigan for Milwaukee residents and Lake Erie for Cleveland 
residents), drinking bottled water instead of tap water drawn from the local Great Lake, 
and taking used or leftover oil and chemicals to a disposal center instead of tossing them 
into the trash or pouring them down the drain.  
Respondents assigned to each hazard topic were asked to indicate the degree to 
which they took into account a set of behavioral beliefs when deciding whether or not to 
perform the given target behavior, their agreement or disagreement that the given target 
behavior would bring about certain outcomes or is associated with certain attributes, and 
their evaluations (i.e., the goodness or badness) of these outcomes and attributes. These 
behavioral beliefs items were derived from presurvey focus groups that were conducted 
by the WSRL in the spring of 1996 to elicit relevant, salient behavioral beliefs. In the tap 
water hazard scenario, respondents rated on 5-point Likert-type scales the extent to which 
they took into account (a) risk from a waterborne parasite, (b) time, (c) convenience, (d) 
expense, (e) risk from chemicals in the water, (f) refreshment, and (g) taste of the water 
when deciding whether or not to drink bottled water instead of tap water drawn from the 
local Great Lake. They also indicated their agreement or disagreement with how drinking 
bottled water instead of Great Lakes tap water would influence these factors, and whether 
they valued or disliked such outcomes.  
Respondents can strongly (dis)agree with, (dis)agree with, or feel neutral about a 
behavioral belief that drinking bottled water would cause a certain outcome. Extreme 
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agreement or disagreement was coded as 1, and (dis)agreement and neutral were coded as 
0. The number of strongly held behavioral beliefs was calculated for each respondent by 
counting how many of these seven behavioral beliefs the respondent strongly agreed or 
disagreed with (M = .36, SD = .93). Including those extreme responses only was 
expected to help minimize social desirability biases and respondent agreeability in the 
telephone interview situation.  
Strength of Outcome Evaluations 
Respondents were asked to evaluate the outcome of each of the seven behavioral 
beliefs. On 5-point Likert-type scales, respondents indicated how they agreed or 
disagreed with the following statements: “Anything that lowers my risk of becoming ill 
from a parasite is good;” “Anything that takes a lot of time is bad;” “Anything that is 
convenient is good;” “Anything that lowers my risk of becoming ill from chemicals is 
good;” “Anything that is inexpensive is good;” “Any water that is not refreshing is bad;” 
and “Tap water drawn from Lake Michigan/Erie tastes good.” Responses were folded 
over around “feel neutral” such that strong agreement or disagreement was coded as high 
(coded as 3), (dis)agreement as medium (coded as 2), and feel neutral as low (coded as 
1). The seven items were then summed to create a single index reflecting strength of 
belief outcome evaluations (Cronbach’s Alpha = .70).  
Cognitive Structure 
Following the expectancy-value model on which TPB is relied, each behavioral 
belief was multiplied by its corresponding outcome evaluation. The resulting product 
compounds were then summed to create the variable of cognitive structure (Cronbach’s 
Alpha = .57).  
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Because the strength of cognitive structure, not direction, is especially relevant to 
depth of information processing, a measure of strength of cognitive structure was 
obtained by converting each negative belief × evaluation compound into positive one, 
with positive and zero-value compounds remaining the same. Then a measure of strength 
of cognitive structure was obtained by summing all the belief × evaluation compounds.  
Attitude toward the Behavior 
Attitude toward the behavior of drinking bottled water instead of Great Lakes tap 
water was measured using five items. Respondents were asked to rate on 5-point Likert-
type scales how they agreed or disagreed with the following statements: “For me to drink 
bottled water instead of tap water drawn from Lake Michigan/Erie would be a good thing 
to do;” “For me to drink bottled water instead of tap water drawn from Lake 
Michigan/Erie would be unpleasant for me” (reversely coded); “For me to drink bottled 
water instead of tap water drawn from Lake Michigan/Erie would be beneficial for me;” 
“For me to drink bottled water instead of tap water drawn from Lake Michigan/Erie 
would be a useless thing to do” (reversely coded); and “For me to drink bottled water 
instead of tap water drawn from Lake Michigan/Erie would be a rewarding thing to do.” 
A summated scale reflecting attitude toward the behavior was obtained by averaging the 
five items (Cronbach’s Alpha = .78). 
As noted earlier, because the strength of attitude toward the behavior, not 
direction, is of primary relevance to depth of information processing, a measure of 
strength of attitude was obtained by folding the original attitude measure, which centered 
around 3 (“Feel Neutral”), such that a continuum of attitude strength was formed with 
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neutral at the lowest end (coded as 3) and strong (dis)agreement at the highest end (coded 
as 5) (M = 3.54, SD = .38).  
Subjective Norms 
One 5-point Likert-type scale item was used to measure respondents’ subjective 
norms as they rated the extent to which they agreed with the statement: “Most people 
who are important to me think that I should drink bottled water instead of tap water 
drawn from Lake Michigan/Erie.”  
Perceived Behavioral Control 
Perceived behavioral control was measured using two items. Respondents were 
asked to indicate their agreement with the following statements on 5-point Likert-type 
scales: “If I wanted to, I could easily drink bottled water instead of tap water drawn from 
Lake Michigan/Erie;” and “I have personal control over whether or not I would drink 
bottled water instead of tap water drawn from Lake Michigan/Erie.” A summated scale of 
perceived behavioral control was obtained by averaging the two items (Cronbach’s Alpha 
= .74).  
Behavioral Intention 
Behavioral intention in regard to drinking bottled water rather than Great Lakes 
tap water was measured with one item, as respondents rated on a 5-point Likert-type 
scale their agreement with the statement that “Given the opportunity to drink tap water 
from Lake Michigan/Erie in the next few days, I would definitely drink bottled water 
instead.” 
Alternative Behavior 
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In addition to the RISP and TPB variables, attitudes toward alternative risk-
coping behaviors were also measured in order to investigate how these attitudes may 
influence a person’s intention to perform a given risk-coping behavior. Besides drinking 
bottled water instead of tap water drawn from the local Great Lake, three other alternative 
behaviors were examined: boiling the tap water, using a filtering device before drinking 
the tap water, and drinking other beverages instead of the tap water. Respondents 
indicated on 5-point Likert-type scales their attitudes toward these three alternative 
behaviors. A single index was then created by summing the three alternative behavior 
items (M = 9.25, SD = 2.49, Cronbach’s Alpha = .70).  
Control Variables 
Five demographic variables, panel sensitization, and community were used as 
control variables for the present study. The demographic variables include gender, age, 
minority status (White or non-White), education (eighth grade or less coded as 1, some 
high school 2, high school graduate 3, some college 4, college graduate 5, and post 
graduate or professional 6), and annual household income (before taxes). Descriptive 
statistics for the demographic variables are as below: gender (53.4% females), age (M = 
49.08, SD = 16.45), minority status (24% non-Whites), education (M = 4.06, SD = 1.21), 
and income (M = 42,410, SD = 25,070). Respondents who were newly added to the 
second wave were coded 0 for panel sensitization (20.6%); those who were interviewed 
during the previous wave were coded 1. Respondents’ community—Milwaukee (54.4%) 
or Cleveland—was also used as a control variable.  
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Ⅴ. RESULTS 
 
 
The analyses performed were focused on two sets of relationships: a) 
relationships that the two variables of risk information processing had with the four 
measures of depth of processing—the number of strongly held behavioral beliefs, the 
strength of evaluations of belief outcomes, the strength of cognitive structure (or belief-
based measure of attitude), and the strength of attitude toward the behavior. Systematic 
processing was expected to be positively related to the first three measures (H1a through 
H1c), while heuristic processing negatively related to the same three variables (H1d 
through H1f). In particular, because cognitive structure is an indirect measure of attitude, 
a positive relationship between the strength of cognitive structure and attitude strength 
(H2a) and between cognitive structure and attitude toward the behavior (H2b) was also 
anticipated; and b) relationships of the three predictors (i.e., attitude toward the behavior, 
subjective norms, and perceived behavioral control) as proposed by the TPB to 
behavioral intention, as well as how attitude toward alternative risk-coping behaviors 
might affect intention to perform a target behavior (RQ6). Specifically, attitude toward 
the behavior was expected to be positively related to behavioral intention (H3). 
Subjective norms and perceived behavioral control should also correlate positively with 
behavioral intention (H4 and H5).  
Results from partial correlation analyses reveal that the number of strongly held 
behavioral beliefs regarding the performance of a target risk-coping behavior is positively 
related to systematic processing (partial r = .29, p ≤ .001, one-tailed), and negatively 
related to heuristic processing (partial r = -.17, p ≤ .01, one-tailed), as shown in Table 1.  
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Evaluation strength of belief outcomes is also positively related to systematic processing 
(partial r = .23, p ≤ .001, one-tailed), and negatively related to heuristic processing 
(partial r = -.13, p ≤ .05, one-tailed). Furthermore, this pattern is repeated for cognitive 
structure strength, as it is positively related to systematic processing (partial r = .22, p ≤ 
.001, one-tailed) and negatively related to heuristic processing (partial r = -.12, p ≤ .05, 
one-tailed). Additionally, strength of attitude toward the behavior is also found to be 
negatively related to heuristic processing (partial r = -.12, p ≤ .05, one-tailed). Thus, 
controlling for gender, age, education, minority status, income, community, and panel 
sensitization, H1a through H1f were supported.  
A further look at the path analysis of strength of attitude toward the behavior (see 
Figure 1 and Table 2), with all demographic, community, and panel sensitization 
variables being controlled for, shows that systematic processing has an indirect positive 
effect on attitude strength, through the mediation of cognitive structure strength (β = .06, 
p ≤ .05, one-tailed). Strength of cognitive structure, in the meanwhile, has a direct 
positive effect on attitude strength (β = .31, p ≤ .01, one-tailed). Hence H2a received 
empirical support. Together, systematic processing, heuristic processing, and strength of 
cognitive structure account for approximately 9% of variance in attitude strength (R2 = 
.09, p ≤ .05). Moreover, systematic processing has direct positive influence on number of 
strongly held behavioral beliefs (β = .27, p ≤ .01, one-tailed) and strength of outcome 
evaluations (β = .21, p ≤ .01, one-tailed), in addition to cognitive structure strength (β = 
.21, p ≤ .05, one-tailed). No such relationships, however, were found for heuristic 
processing. Nonetheless, since heuristic processing and systematic processing are inter-
correlated (partial r = -.44, p ≤ .05), it is likely that the effects of heuristic processing on  
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Figure 1 Path Diagram of Strength of Attitude toward the Behavior 
Notes. N = 204. Control variables: gender, age, education, minority status, income, 
community, and panel sensitization.  
RMSEA = .261. PCLOSE = .000.  
Significance key: *p ≤ .05  **p ≤ .01  ***p ≤ .001, two-tailed. +p ≤ .05  ++p ≤ .01  +++p ≤ .001, 
one-tailed.  
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the four endogenous variables were reduced to non-significance when covariance with 
systematic processing was controlled for in path analysis. This may indicate that 
systematic processing is a more robust predictor to depth of processing and attitude 
strength than is heuristic processing (Griffin et al., 2002). Altogether, controlling for 
demographic, community, and panel sensitization variables, systematic processing and 
heuristic processing account for approximately 9% of variance in number of strongly held 
behavioral beliefs (R2 = .09, p ≤ .05), 5% of variance in strength of cognitive structure 
(R2 = .05, p ≤ .05), and 5% of variance in strength of outcome evaluations (R2 = .05, p ≤ 
.05), as shown in Figure 1.  
Path analysis was also conducted to test the relationships that behavioral intention 
had with its potential predictors (see Figure 2 and Table 3). With all demographic, 
community, and panel sensitization variables being controlled for, cognitive structure has 
a direct positive effect on attitude toward the behavior (β = .59, p ≤ .01, one-tailed), 
accounting for approximately 35% of variance in attitude toward the behavior (R2 = .35, 
p ≤ .05). Additionally, attitude toward the behavior has a direct positive impact on 
behavioral intention (β = .36, p ≤ .01, one-tailed), and serves as a mediator of the 
influence of cognitive structure on behavioral intention (β = .21, p ≤ .01, one-tailed). 
Subjective norms also have a direct positive effect on behavioral intention (β = .29, p ≤ 
.01, one-tailed). Therefore, H2b, H3, and H4 were empirically supported. Unlike what is 
proposed in the TPB, however, a hypothesized positive relationship between perceived 
behavioral control and behavioral intention is not found in the present analysis. This is 
consistent with a considerable portion of prior research (Cheung, Chan, & Wong, 1999; 
Kaiser & Gutscher, 2003; Shaw, Radler, Chenoweth, Heilberger, & Dearlove, 2011).  
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Figure 2 Path Diagram of Behavioral Intention 
Notes. N = 204. Control variables: gender, age, education, minority status, income, community, 
and panel sensitization.  
RMSEA = .136. PCLOSE = .009. 
Significance key: *p ≤ .05  **p ≤ .01  ***p ≤ .001, two-tailed. +p ≤ .05  ++p ≤ .01  +++p ≤ .001, 
one-tailed.  
Multiple regression shows R squared for behavioral intention as significant at p ≤ .001.  
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Given the high level of PBC among respondents (M = 4.06, SD = .54), the predictive 
strength of PBC to behavioral intention may have diminished as a result of the elevated 
volitional control over the performance of drinking bottled water (Ajzen, 1991). H5 was 
hence rejected. In addition, the potential relationship between behavioral intention and 
individuals’ attitude toward alternative behaviors was also explored. Unexpectedly, 
alternative behavior has a direct positive effect on behavioral intention (β = .17, p ≤ .05). 
Multiple regression analysis reveals that among the three alternative behaviors examined 
(boiling tap water, using filtering device, drinking other beverages), boiling tap water 
carries more weight than the other two alternative behaviors in predicting behavioral 
intention (data not shown). The path analysis also finds three positive correlations 
between cognitive structure and alternative behavior (partial r = .55, p ≤ .01), between 
cognitive structure and subjective norms (partial r = .40, p ≤ .01), and between subjective 
norms and alternative behavior (partial r = .47, p ≤ .01), as shown in Figure 2.  
Hierarchical regression analyses reveal that with all demographic, community, 
and panel sensitization variables being controlled for, the hypothesized relationships 
account for about 42.5% of variance in behavioral intention (Adjusted R2 = .43, p ≤ .001), 
as shown in Table 4. The model by model comparison indicates that attitude toward the 
behavior is the main intervening variable between cognitive structure and behavioral 
intention, as the relationship between cognitive structure and behavioral intention was 
largely reduced when AAct was entered as a block. The relationship between cognitive 
structure and behavioral intention was further reduced, though not as much, when SN 
was controlled for. This might suggest some crossover effects between attitude toward 
the behavior and subjective norms, as these predictors may not always be independent  
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from each other. Unexpectedly, the alternative behavior variable appears to be a 
suppressor of the negative relationship between panel sensitization and behavioral 
intention. When attitude toward alternative behaviors was controlled for, it turned out that 
new respondents had stronger behavioral intention to drink bottled water instead of local 
Great Lake tap water in the following days (β = -.12, p ≤ .05). Possible explanations are 
discussed in the next section.  
The main analyses performed in the present study suggest several follow-up 
analyses as well. First, an intriguing question is whether number of strongly held 
behavioral beliefs and strength of outcome evaluations also predict to attitude strength, 
since conceptually they are surrogates for attitude strength as well. Controlling for 
gender, age, education, minority status, income, community, and panel sensitization, 
follow-up path analysis found that number of strongly held behavioral beliefs had a direct 
positive effect on attitude strength (β = .30, p ≤ .01, one-tailed), while no such 
relationship was found between evaluation strength and attitude strength. Moreover, 
linking number of strongly held behavioral beliefs and attitude strength lowered the 
relationship between cognitive structure strength and attitude strength to non-
significance, although the relationship remained positive. It should be noted that 
cognitive structure strength contains both belief strength and evaluation strength. 
Controlling for belief strength in particular might have sapped the relationship between 
cognitive structure strength and attitude strength by removing much of the role of belief 
strength within cognitive structure strength. Nonetheless, whether that is a measurement 
issue, an analytic issue, or a theoretical issue should be the key focus of future 
investigations.  
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A second follow-up question concerns whether heuristic processing and 
systematic processing also predict to cognitive structure (bidirectional), not just cognitive 
structure strength. Controlling for demographic, community, and panel sensitization 
variables, path analysis showed that systematic processing indeed had a direct positive 
effect on cognitive structure (β = .21, p ≤ .05, one-tailed). Moreover, systematic 
processing had indirect positive effects on AAct (mediated by cognitive structure; β = 
.12, p ≤ .01, one-tailed) and on BI (mediated by cognitive structure and AAct; β = .05, p 
≤ .01, one-tailed). These findings are consistent with previous research (Yang et al., 
2010a). From a theory development perspective, these results showed empirical support 
for the usefulness of integrating HSM and TPB variables by incorporating systematic 
processing as antecedent to risk-related attitudes and behaviors.  
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Ⅵ. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
Utilizing the Risk Information Seeking and Processing (RISP) model (Griffin et 
al., 1999), the Heuristic-Systematic Model (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993), and the Theory of 
Planned Behavior (Ajzen, 1988) as the theoretical foundations, this study sets out to 
examine the central proposition that the basic modalities of systematic processing and 
heuristic processing of risk information are related to depth of processing, which predicts 
to attitude stability and behavioral intention related to the performance of a given risk-
coping behavior. The theoretical underpinnings can be found in the HSM proposition that 
more intense, effortful systematic processing leads to more stable attitudes, whereas 
attitudes developed on the basis of heuristic processing are more volatile and less 
resistant to counterargument (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). The TPB provides a more detailed 
account of this psychological mechanism. Specifically, as processing effort increases, 
individuals tend to hold a greater number of strong behavioral beliefs, their evaluations of 
the outcomes of these behavioral beliefs tend to become more extreme, and the resulting 
cognitive structure, or the belief-based measure of attitude of which beliefs and 
evaluations are a part, strengthens at the same time. Cognitive structure then predicts to 
attitude toward the behavior, which, along with other TPB variables including subjective 
norms and perceived behavioral control, further predicts to behavioral intention, and 
ultimately, behavior.  
Findings from the present analysis have largely supported these theoretical 
propositions. Individuals who engaged in more systematic processing of information 
about tap water risks turned out to possess a greater number of strongly held behavioral 
beliefs regarding drinking bottled water, have more polarized evaluations of the goodness 
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and badness of the outcomes of those behavioral beliefs, and have stronger cognitive 
structure and attitude when considering drinking bottled water instead of Great Lakes tap 
water. Furthermore, the findings showed that cognitive structure, both in terms of 
direction and strength, appears to be consistent with attitude toward the behavior. 
Individuals who harbored a favorable attitude toward drinking bottled water indicated 
greater intention to drink bottled water instead of local Great Lake tap water. Those who 
felt greater social pressures to drink bottled water instead of Great Lakes tap water also 
reported stronger intention to do so.  
The present analysis did not find a hypothesized positive relationship between 
perceived behavioral control and intention to drink bottled water, however. This may be 
due at least to two reasons. First, there are only two items in the PBC index, which may 
have lowered the reliability of the scale given that reliability is largely a function of the 
number of items in a scale when there are adequate inter-item correlations (Griffin et al., 
2002). The moderate reliability may have also attenuated the effect size of the 
relationship being examined to the extent that it vanishes. Future studies should refine the 
measurement of the PBC variable and include more items as time and cost allow. 
Another possible explanation for the poor performance of the PBC variable concentrates 
on the theorizing of PBC as an independent behavior motivator. While having a greater 
sense of volitional control over performing a behavior may increase the possibility that a 
person performs the behavior when s/he wants to, a person is not necessarily motivated to 
perform the behavior on the mere basis that s/he thinks s/he has the ability to do so. Ajzen 
(1991) also pointed out that as individuals’ volitional control over performing a behavior 
increases, the predictive value of the PBC variable decreases. Other researchers have 
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suggested that PBC is a significant predictor in some behavioral domains but not in 
others and thus is a non-universally applicable and nongeneralizable part of the TPB 
(Kaiser & Gutscher, 2003; Shaw et al., 2011).  
Less examined in prior risk communication research, how alternative behaviors 
may affect intention to perform a given risk-reducing behavior was explored in the 
present analysis. In contrast to the plausible prospect that a favorable attitude toward 
alternative behaviors may dilute people’s intention to perform a target risk-reducing 
behavior, individuals who expressed a more favorable attitude toward boiling tap water 
before drinking it also showed greater behavioral intention to drink bottled water. One 
possibility, grist for future research, is that folks who perceive higher risks from drinking 
Great Lakes tap water and who have stronger intention to avoid such risks are open to a 
wider range of strategies that show the promise of protecting them from the risks, and 
that they tend to be more willing to carry out those risk-coping behaviors than their less 
risk-averse counterparts. Future research should examine these factors and associated 
processes more fully.  
Although not central to the research concerns of this study, an additional finding 
warrants particular comment. Attitude toward alternative behaviors appears to suppress 
the negative relationship between panel sensitization and behavioral intention. In other 
words, previous panel members have lesser behavioral intention to drink bottled water 
than new respondents, but this relationship is suppressed under the influence of attitude 
toward alternative behaviors. One possible scenario here is that respondents who 
participated in the first wave became sensitized with the risk issue of drinking Great 
Lakes tap water. It is likely that those first wave interviews made potential hazards 
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lurking in Great Lakes tap water a more salient concern to these panel members and 
evoked thoughts on the risk topic. As panel members continued to process relevant risk 
information and reflect on available coping strategies, they might figure that drinking 
bottled water was not the best option to handle the risks, leading to a dampened intention 
to drink bottled water. In the meanwhile, these previous panel members were motivated 
to consider an array of available risk-reducing options and might conclude that other 
methods such as boiling tap water before drinking it would be as good as, if not better 
than, drinking bottled water. Given the finding that favorable attitude toward alternative 
behaviors are associated with stronger intention to drink bottled water, panel members’ 
preferences for alternative risk-reducing strategies may have counterbalanced their lack 
of enthusiasm for drinking bottled water. In fact, post hoc analysis reveals a positive 
relationship between panel sensitization and attitude toward alternative behaviors (partial 
r = .14, p ≤ .05), with gender, age, education, minority status, income, community, and 
behavioral intention being controlled for. This unanticipated finding opens avenues for 
new research. Sorting these dynamics out could be empirically and theoretically fruitful 
for future investigations.  
There are several limitations of this study that need to be acknowledged. First, the 
data on which this analysis is based were collected in the late 1990s, and therefore do not 
necessarily reflect current trends in public opinion on the risk issue of drinking tap water 
as well as on associated risk-coping behaviors such as drinking bottled water. 
Nonetheless, the age of the dataset is irrelevant to the research concerns raised in this 
study as the major focus here is theory testing based on three conceptual models. Second, 
the measures of some variables such as perceived behavioral control could be improved. 
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If time and cost allow, future studies should include more items in constructing single 
scales in order to enhance reliabilities. Third, the telephone interview setting dictated the 
use of 5-point Likert-type scales, instead of 7-point scales, which may have attenuated 
the effect size for some relationships examined, and may have diminished what would 
otherwise be significant relationships.  
Nonetheless, findings from this study have important theoretical and practical 
implications. From the standpoint of enhancing the effectiveness of risk communication 
practice, these findings confirm that there is value in engaging the audience in more in-
depth and effortful deliberations of given risk issues and available coping options. Risk 
communication campaigns that are aimed at inducing sustainable behavioral changes 
should seek ways to catalyze systematic processing of judgment-relevant risk information 
in the audience, given that attitudes formed on the basis of systematic processing are 
more enduring and are more likely to lead to behavioral changes. On the one hand, risk 
managers may attain this goal by investing effort in public engagement practices and 
outreach activities (Chen & Deng, 2007; Rose, Korzekwa, Brossard, Scheufele, & 
Heisler, 2017). One the other hand, as previous RISP research (Griffin, Dunwoody, 
Neuwirth, & Giese, 1999; Griffin, Dunwoody, & Yang, 2012; Griffin et al., 2004; 
Griffin, Yang, ter Huurne, Boerner, Ortiz, & Dunwoody, 2008; Kahlor, Dunwoody, 
Griffin, & Neuwirth, 2006; Kahlor et al., 2003; Yang et al., 2014; Yang, Seo, Rickard, & 
Harrison, 2015) has noted, risk managers should also take into account elements that may 
lead to systematic processing when they are crafting and delivering risk messages.  
In spite of the noble goal of facilitating systematic processing, situations can arise 
where systematic processing can hardly be instigated in audience members, due to their 
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lack of capacity and/or motivation to exert necessary processing effort (Eagly & Chaiken, 
1993). When this is the case, risk managers should find ways to identify and utilize 
effective heuristic cues that may help promote health attitudes and behaviors in specific 
audiences.  Particularly, as the present study finds, the role of subjective norms in 
perpetuating behavioral adoption and maintenance is worthy of practical attention. 
Subjective norms may work as a powerful heuristic that triggers heuristic processing in 
audience members in the presence of information that contains normative cues and 
thereafter fosters the establishment of health attitudes and adoption of preventive actions. 
Hence, risk managers may profit from incorporating normative cues into message design. 
Previous studies have also found that heightened perceptions of associated social 
pressures can boost perceived issue salience (Spartz, Su, Griffin, Brossard, & Dunwoody, 
2015) and behavioral intention (Griskevicius, Cialdini, & Goldstein, 2008; Howell, 
Shaw, & Alvarez, 2015; Schultz, Nolan, Cialdini, Goldstein, & Griskevicius, 2007; Shaw 
et al., 2011).  
Furthermore, from a theory development perspective, results from the current 
analysis suggest the usefulness of linking the HSM, RISP, and TPB variables, 
particularly that of incorporating systematic processing as antecedent to cognitive 
structure, attitude, and behavior. This theory integration allows for a richer understanding 
of the cognitive processes of risk-related attitudes and behaviors, and for more precise 
prediction of these persuasive outcomes. Findings from this study identify important 
pathways to enhance communication effort aimed at facilitating adoption of health 
behaviors, which are still applicable to many of today’s issues of concern including water 
quality risk issues. For example, research to date suggests that capacity (both actual and 
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perceived capacity) to exercise effortful processing is a prerequisite for systematic 
processing of risk information (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Griffin et al., 2008). It appears 
that processing capacity is positively associated with formal education and with 
knowledge that individuals already possess in the risk domain (Griffin et al., 2008). 
Therefore, risk managers may need to make extra effort to ensure that risk information is 
sufficiently comprehensible for those less educated and less knowledgeable audiences in 
order for systematic processing to happen. One such effort, for instance, is to initiate 
public educational programs that are intended to improve various audiences’ capacity to 
understand and evaluate risk information. In the meanwhile, risk managers are advised to 
take steps to minimize potential situational constraints on effortful processing. For 
instance, to allow for ample time for systematic processing and reduce the cost incurred 
on the audience’s part, risk managers could consider distributing risk information through 
information channels that are more readily accessible to the audience.  
Finally, findings from this study confirm the value of an audience-based approach 
to risk communication, which means understanding audience members’ processing needs 
and catering to these needs with individualized communication strategies. Moreover, the 
linked mechanisms of processing modalities, depth of processing, attitude stability, and 
behavioral intention have implications that go beyond the realm of risk communication, 
to other research contexts where information processing, attitude, and behavior are the 
key elements of inquiry.  
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Appendices 
 
 
Appendix A: Table of Factor Analysis of Systematic and Heuristic Risk Information 
Processing Items (Reproduced from Griffin et al., 2002) 
 
 
Item 
Factor Loadings 
Factor 1 
Systematic Processing 
Factor 2 
Heuristic Processing 
After I encounter information about 
this topic, I am likely to stop and think 
about it.  
 .59 -.14 
If I need to act on this matter, the more 
viewpoints I get the better.  
 .50 -.12 
After thinking about this topic, I have 
a broader understanding.  
 .49  .11 
When I encounter information about 
this topic, I read or listen to most of it, 
even though I may not agree with its 
perspective.  
 .42 -.09 
It is important for me to interpret 
information about this topic in a way 
that applies directly to my life.  
 .41 -.01 
When I encounter information about 
this topic, I focus on only a few key 
points.  
 .11  .56 
There is far more information on this 
topic than I personally need.  
                -.11  .48 
When I see or hear information about 
this topic, I rarely spend much time 
thinking about it.  
-.21  .43 
If I need to act on this matter, the 
advice of one expert is enough for me.  
-.06  .41 
Sum of squared loadings 1.93               0.43 
Percentage of variance               21.4               4.7 
 
Note. Principle axis factoring procedure. Oblique rotation. Factor correlation = -.48.  
